Attorney Agrees to Three Year Suspension for Misappropriation as Nonprofit Treasurer
On April 14, 2025, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania accepted a consent agreement and
suspended a Pittsburgh attorney for three years following her plea of guilty to Misapplication of Entrusted Funds for checks she wrote while serving as treasurer of a nonprofit organization.
A
Joint Petition in Support of Discipline on Consent states that Rebecca Stein was elected as Treasurer of the Fort Pitt Chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution and the Fort Pitt Blockhouse in 2018. In this capacity, she had sole authority to write checks on the organizations’ investment accounts which amounted to approximately $500,000.
In May 2022, Stein was elected Regent of the organizations, and a new Treasurer was appointed. However, Stein failed to turn over the organizations’ computer until October 2022 or to add the new Treasurer as a signatory on the accounts until January 2023.
In January 2023, a representative of the organizations’ financial management informed a former regent that, if the organizations continued to spend at the rate they had during the two previous years, the funds would be depleted by the end of 2023.
An investigation revealed that Stein had written checks in excess of $315,000, without seeking approval of the Board of Directors as required by policy, only $37,000 of which were legitimate organization expenses. The rest were for her own benefit including payments to personal credit cards and accounts. She had falsified records to conceal these payments.
Stein was charged with several theft-related offenses and pled guilty to Misapplication of Entrusted Funds,
18 Pa.C.S. §4113(a), a misdemeanor. She was sentenced to two years of probation.
The Joint Petition noted that this conduct violated
RPC 8.4(c), criminal conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law, and also that the conviction was cause for discipline under
Pa.R.D.E. 203(b)(1). While her misappropriation was not of client funds, she used her position of responsibility to steal from charitable organizations that rely on the generosity of the public for their operations.
The agreement notes several mitigating factors including acceptance of responsibility for her actions, full restitution of $277,093, and effects of a bipolar disorder which is under treatment.
After reviewing several prior dispositions, the parties agreed that a suspension of three years was the appropriate discipline. The Supreme Court accepted this recommendation and suspended Stein for three years.
Attorney Receives Stayed Suspension for Sexual Comments to Client
By
Order dated April 23, 2025, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania suspended a Philadelphia attorney for six months and stayed that suspension in favor of a six-month period of probation. The Order granted a Joint Petition in Support of Discipline on Consent, entered into by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and attorney Gary P. Lightman, in which the Respondent acknowledged that he had made repeated inappropriate sexual comments toward a client.
The Joint Petition stated that Lightman represented a woman in sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and hostile workplace environment claims against her employer. He referred her to counsel in the state of New York who filed a lawsuit in that jurisdiction with Lightman engaged to provide work on the case and receive a share of the recovery.
In November 2018, Lightman and the client made plans to meet near her home in Florida to discuss the case. He arrived at her condo to pick her up for the meeting and asked to use the bathroom. While passing through her bedroom from the bathroom, he made an unwelcome verbal sexual advance. When she became upset at the advance, he told her to “lighten up.” When he brought her back to the condo after their lunch meeting, she asked him how to access the records of her case online. He returned to the condo to show her how to do so on her computer and again made an unwelcome verbal advance. After that, he held late-night or early-morning telephone calls with her in some of which he made inappropriate sexual comments and complained that she lacked a sense of humor. After the last such conversation, she terminated his representation.
Lightman acknowledged that his conduct was wrongful and in violation of
New York Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a)(2), which states, “[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if a reasonable lawyer would conclude that . . . there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of a client will be adversely affected by the lawyer’s own financial, business, property or other personal interests.” The parties applied the New York rule because the client’s case was brought through the New York courts under the Choice of Law provisions of
Pa. R.P.C. 8.5(b)(91).
The Joint Petition noted that several mitigating factors applied including that Lightman had practiced for forty-six years without the imposition of public discipline, his record of pro bono service and community activities, he had apologized to the client, and discipline on consent would spare the client the ordeal of testifying in a hearing. After an analysis of New York disciplinary cases, the parties agreed that a suspension for six months, stayed by probation, was the appropriate discipline. The Joint Petition noted that Lightman has been winding down his legal practice and has only two pending cases in which his partner is not involved.
The Supreme Court approved the Joint Stipulation and entered an order imposing a six-month suspension, stayed in favor of a six-month probation.
Judges Behaving Badly: Two Judges Disciplined for Intemperate Comments
Lesson of the month for judges is: Watch your language.
A New York Judge
agreed to a censure as determined by the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct based on critical comments and reactions to technical changes and management decisions by the Office of Court Administration. Reacting to installation of a new case management system which he opposed,
Binghamton City Court Judge Daniel L. Seiden conducted an extended campaign of arguing with and insulting court administrative personnel. At one point, he raised his voice at court clerks and told them to “stay out of my shorts.” Despite formal adoption of a new case management system, he refused to learn or employ the new technology, insisted he would continue to use the old case management system one, and instructed court staff to continue to provide him with documents developed under the old system. After he was reassigned to a different court, he sent an email to multiple senior court officials about his reassignment to another court in which he made discourteous and insubordinate remarks to them including that their “arrogance is breathtaking,” they were “utterly out of control and intoxicated by power and privilege,” and they used “administrative sleight of hand” which he found “[s]ickening.” He sent numerous emails to judges and staff in the court administration system on several occasions.
Based on a
stipulation of facts and discipline, the Commission on Judicial Conduct concluded that the “Respondent’s disparagement of court officials and his failure to comply with his Administrative Judge’s instructions violated the Rules and contributed to a difficult work environment.” Judge Seiden accepted this disposition.
The Iowa Supreme Court rejected a judicial panel’s recommendation of a ninety-day suspension and
removed a magistrate judge from office after it found that he had used slurs in court proceedings, engaged in blatant stereotyping, and showed no remorse or sign of learning from the disciplinary process.
The Iowa Supreme Court removed Judicial Magistrate
David J. Hanson of Fayette County, Iowa from office. In one case, Hansen denied an application for an arrest warrant against a female suspect who was accused of sexually assaulting a male victim. In a six-page order denying the application for lack of probable cause, among other comments, he stated that the victim was not credible in saying he was unable to push away the female offender as “absurd” given a male’s “innate physical advantage”; argued that “[a]ny self-respecting young male” would have simply removed himself from any sexual touching that was truly unwelcomed; declared the allegation “contrary to nature” because the “normal, hormone-ridden teenage boy’s reaction to being undressed by a teenage girl” is, “Alright! I’m gonna GET some!”; and went into graphic detail about the physiology of the male sex organ to argue that “[c]ommon human experience” undermined the victim’s story. In the disciplinary hearing, he admitted to “ruling in anger” when he denied the arrest warrant application a few days after it was filed.
In a second case, while reviewing a case where the defendant was of Hispanic ethnicity, he noted that the charges were for no license and no insurance and asked, “Is this guy a w[******]? An illegal?” He also asked whether the intern prosecuting the case was sure the defendant was using his real name and commented that the defendant probably stole someone’s ID card or identity. In the discipline hearing, rather than acknowledging that his use of a racial epithet was improper, he labels it as “someone’s taboo” that he “[a]pparently . . . transgressed.”
The Iowa Supreme Court found that Hanson never recognized that these statements were wrong but defended them throughout the Commission’s investigation through oral argument before the Court. He suggested in his brief that the Commission simply provide him with a list of “bad words” so that he can avoid them. He alluded to attacks on Supreme Court nominees during their confirmation proceedings and stated, “I will never abet such ‘high tech lynchings.’” The Court concluded that he “is simply and unalterably unsuited to be a judge, and no attempts at behavior modification are going to change that significantly. [H]e simply should not be a judge.” It thus rejected the recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications for a ninety-day suspension without pay and ordered his removal from office.
Is a Horse a Vehicle?
Most vehicles run on horsepower, but is a horse a one-horsepower vehicle?
Judge Emeritus Leslie Maddox, who presided over many an impaired driving proceeding during her years as a state court judge in Forsyth County, Georgia, provides an
amusing rundown of what constitutes a “vehicle” for the purpose of impaired driving laws.
She cites a 1983 Utah case in which two men were convicted of operating a vehicle while intoxicated when they rode their horses through the streets in a state of inebriation. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the definition of a “vehicle” “cannot be legitimately read to include horses” and vacated the convictions.
Driving a horse-driven conveyance, on the other hand, is a different matter. In 1970, a New York court upheld the conviction of a man driving a horse-drawn stagecoach, and in 1941, an Arizona court did the same for the driver of a wagon drawn by a team of horses. In 2024, an Ohio court concluded that an Amish buggy “is a piece of equipment designed for transportation utilizing horses to draw the device” and thus fits within the definition of a “vehicle” under Ohio’s impaired driving statutes.
In recent years, issues have arisen as to whether devices such as e-scooters, e-bikes, unicycles, hoverboards, snowmobiles, and golf carts are “vehicles.” Many e-bikes and scooters are parked for rental in urban areas convenient to those who may be emerging from watering holes which might predictably be patronized by parties better lubricated than they are. Judge Emeritus Maddox cites a Wisconsin case that upheld the conviction of a man who traveled to the tavern (and presumably back) on his riding lawnmower.
Electric wheelchairs and scooters to assist those with disabilities may fall within impaired driving laws. She recounts having twice prosecuted a man who would go to the tavern in his motorized wheelchair and then take off to visit his girlfriend after imbibing a few.
Judge Emeritus Maddox notes that states have split on whether a bicycle is a vehicle, depending to a great extent on the language of state statutes, but a Missouri court found that motorized bicycle is a powered “vehicle” for purposes of state law.
Boats and water conveyances usually come under specific provisions for navigating on water while intoxicated. She recounts a 2009 Oregon case in which a man argued that his inflatable raft was a “toy or air mattress” excluded under the state statute. The court held that it was more than that, a means of transportation within the contemplation of the statute.
She notes that such cases will require close analysis of applicable statutes and cases, but taking to the road on any contrivance while inebriated is a dangerous form of horsing around.
